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Abstract
The purpose of the current study is to examine how ideology and situational factors shape
terrorist target selection in the United States. While a growing number of studies have examined
target selection by terrorists, the current study is the first to consider how combinations of factors
present situated opportunities for terrorists to select particular types of targets as opposed to
others. Guided by the situational crime prevention approach, this study relies on data from the
American Terrorism Study (ATS) to measure attributes of incidents perpetrated by far-right and
Islamic extremists and target selection. The outcomes of interest include government versus
citizenry targets and human versus non-human targets. Bivariate and multivariate statistical tests
are used to examine how ideology and situational factors statistically predict target selection. In
addition, conjunctive analysis of case configurations (CACC) is used to examine how
configurations of key factors are more or less associated with the selection of particular target
types. Findings indicate that ideology and weapon type were two of the most significant factors
associated with target selection by terrorists. The results of the CACC also revealed that some
configurations of ideological and situational factors resulted in increased or decreased chances
that terrorists would select one type of target over another, highlighting the interconnectedness of
factors shaping target selection. This study concludes with implications for terrorism prevention
and suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Mass casualty events such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 9/11 terrorist
attacks sparked the conversation on domestic terrorism in the United States. While scholarly
research on terrorism began to increase in the late 1970’s and 1980’s, a series of high-profile
terrorism events occurring around the turn-of-the-21st-century resulted in exponential growth in
terrorism research (LaFree et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2008). With the United States facing
continued threats of violence from the extreme far-right and Islamic extremists (Ebner, 2017;
Freilich et al., 2018), one growing area of terrorism research is examining the factors that shape
target selection.
Consensus definitions of terrorism remain elusive (Borum, 2014; Ganor, 2002;
Kundnani, 2012; Sedgwick, 2010), but most researchers and policymakers agree that terrorism is
unique from more routine crimes in that the targets are often symbolic of a larger political or
social motive. High-profile cases highlight some of the key factors shaping the target selection
process. For example, anti-government extremist Timothy McVeigh selected the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for his attack because it housed multiple
federal and state government agencies. Along with political symbolism, practical implications
like target location and accessibility to certain types of weapons may also shape target selection
decisions. In June of 2015, white supremacist Dylan Roof entered the Charleston South Carolina
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church and killed nine African Americans attending
Bible study. One year later, ISIS supporter Omar Mateen opened fire at a gay nightclub in
Orlando, Florida, killing almost 50 clubgoers and injuring many more. In both attacks, targets
were assessed as vulnerable by terrorists, easily accessible with no physical security measures or
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measures that could be easily subdued. Moreover, both targets were attractive to terrorists
because they were occupied with a large number of unarmed civilians who represented social
minority groups demonized by terrorists’ ideologies.
Prior research has found that several factors help to shape terrorists’ selection of targets,
including ideology (Ahmed, 2018; Asal et al., 2009; Becker, 2014 Drake, 1998, Hoffman, 1998)
and an increasing desire to attack “softer” targets (Sandler, 2014). Less is known, however, about
other potential situational and background factors that might shape target selection. Thus far,
researchers have explored target selection by a single type of terrorist such that how target
selection compares across ideological motives remains unclear. In addition, prior research on
terrorist target selection have conceptualized potential factors shaping target selection as
independent of one another. It is likely, however, that those factors shaping target selection do
not operate in isolation but instead in combination to attract or deter terrorists.
The Current Study
The purpose of this study is to examine how combinations of event-level factors,
including situational and target-specific attributes, influence terrorist target selection by extreme
far-right and radical Islamic terrorists. The framework of the study is guided by situational crime
prevention (SCP), which has been used by criminologists for decades to understand and reduce
opportunities for crime to occur (Clarke, 1980). Previous work has tended to conceptualize
elements of criminal and terrorist opportunity (e.g., exposure, security, weapon use, etc.) in
isolation. In contrast, the current study draws from data provided by the American Terrorism
Study (ATS) to investigate how elements of terrorist opportunity operate in combination to shape
terrorist decision-making about target selection. More specifically, this study draws from Clarke
& Newman’s (2006) conceptualizations of target vulnerability and attractiveness to better
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understand how particular target attributes shape whether they will be selected by terrorists. Also
of interest will be how terrorist co-offending, weapon sophistication, and the distance travel to
commit attacks increase the likelihood that particular types of targets will be selected. The study
will seek to answer the following research questions:

Research Question 1 - How do situational factors and target-specific attributes of
attractiveness shape terrorists’ target selection?
Research Question 1a - How do particular combinations of situational factors and
measures of target attractiveness shape terrorists’ target selection?

The analysis for the study occurs in two steps. First, I examine the statistical relationships
between elements of terrorist opportunity and target selection of targets for both extreme farright and radical Islamic terrorists based on a series of binary logistic regression models. Second,
I explore how various combinations of event-level factors are more or less associated with
different target types using analytical techniques of Conjunctive Analysis of Case Configurations
(CACC or “conjunctive analysis”).
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CHAPTER TWO
Theoretical Orientation and Literature Review
Early sociological and criminological theories of crime sought a more informed
understanding of the underlining causal mechanisms leading to criminal behavior. In the late
19th century, social theories focused on biological determinism, examining how biological
markers inherent from birth influence criminal propensity. Ceasare Lambroso (1911) argued that
criminals were atavistic or biologically different than non-criminals. By the early to mid 20th
century, scholars were studying how the social makeup of communities and the inability to attain
the American dream were fueling crime (Merton, 1938; Shaw and McKay, 1942). While these
theories were important in understanding the underlying mechanisms that push and pull
individuals to commit crime, some environmental scholars argued that prominent social theories
of crime ignored the role of place in shaping the occurrence of crime.
In response, the Chicago School began studying how place shaped the nature of crime
(Park and Burgess, 1925; Shaw and McKay, 1942). Chicago was a rising urban center at the
time, leading scholars to see the city as an ideal setting to study how the urban environment
impacts the social world. Analyzing the urban impact on society, Parks and Burgess (1925)
noticed unique areas within the urban city and developed areas known as concentric zones.
Zones such as the central business district and the working-class zone were unique in the social
makeup of the area and thus were impacted by society differently. Examining the environmental
characteristics of immigrant neighborhoods around Chicago, Shaw and McKay (1942) proposed
that poverty, residential stability and ethnic heterogeneity were high correlates of crime and
delinquency. This became known as social disorganization theory, which displayed the
importance of examining the spatio-temporal variability of crime.
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By the early 1970s, crime control strategies such as deterrence and rehabilitation were
beginning to be viewed as largely unsuccessful. The term environmental criminology was first
introduced by C.R. Jeffrey in 1971, when he insisted that the focus of crime prevention should be
on stopping crime before it ever occurs. Environmental criminology focuses on the acts of crime
and how the surrounding built environment influences opportunities to commit crimes. One
example of an environmental theory applied to crime is Crime Prevention through
Environmental Design (CPTED) (Jeffrey, 1971), which emphasizes how the built environment,
such as street lights, can impact the likelihood of crime to occur at a certain place or time of day.
Another popular application of environmental criminology is known as hot spot analysis, which
describes the concentration of locations and patterns of criminal activity (Sherman et al., 1989).
Based on this approach, police agencies across the world have developed strategies known as hot
spot policing which allows agencies with limited resources to target hot spot areas where they
believe crime is most likely to occur. The following sections cover the three main theoretical
branches of environmental criminology, including 1) rational choice theory, 2) routine activities
theory, and 3) crime pattern theory.

Rational Choice Theory
Rational Choice theory has its roots in the 18th century in what is considered the classical
period of criminology with the work of Cesare Beccaria. Beccaria (1764) argued that individuals
act in their own self-interest and evaluate the costs and benefits of committing crime. Crime is
thought to be a choice of free-will and the best way to deter individuals from crime is through
swift and severe punishment. Robert Keel (1997) describes the central themes of classical theory
as human beings behaving as rational actors that freely choose their behavior, whether it is
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engaging in conforming or deviant behavior. Rationality involves a calculation of cost benefit,
weighing pleasure versus pain, and individuals typically chose decisions to maximize their own
individual pleasure.
After the emergence of competing schools of thoughts, the classical period laid dormant
for many years until it was revived again in the 1980’s. Researchers began questioning the
decision-making process of offenders and how it functions. Cornish and Clarke (1985/1986)
introduced their version of rational choice theory, arguing that while individuals seek to
maximize the benefits and minimize the costs, they are not perfectly rational in their decision
making. Instead they are limited in scope by time and the availability of relevant information
within the decision-making process. This addition to the theory becomes known as “bounded
rationality.” Cornish and Clarke used this revised theory to better understand crime
displacement, or the relocation of crime from one area to another as a result of policies and
police intervention. They also argued that the decision-making process is crime specific,
meaning that it can change depending on the types of crime (Cornish and Clarke, 1987).
Rational choice theory has faced criticism, with opponents arguing that offenders are
often impulsive and commit crimes spontaneously without planning or weighing out the costs
and benefits (Benson and Sams, 2013; Carmichael and Piquero, 2004). In examining the illegal
purchase of tobacco products by minors, Ogrady (2011) critiques rational choice theory by
suggesting that not all offenders are rational beings. For example, Not Criminally Responsible on
Account Due to Mental Disorder (NCRMD) offenders are deemed irrational in the eyes of the
courts and are therefore not legally responsible for their actions. Proponents of rational choice
theory argue that rationality is broad by definition and crimes that may seem against the self-
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interest of the offender often have benefits that are intangible such as excitement or status
advancement (Cullen et al., 2006).

Routine Activities Theory
Routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) operates under the assumption that
rational people are shaped by available opportunities within particular environments.
Specifically, routine activity theory assumes that offenders are usually rational beings that weigh
the costs and benefits of criminal activity and seek to maximize personal gain. Routine activity
theory contains elements of both a macro and micro level theory. The macro-level approach
examines how the daily activities and patterns of movement within society impact rates of crime
and trends, while the micro-level approach examines the situation in which crime is likely to
occur
Cohen and Felson relied on this approach to examine changes in daily activities of
society post World War II. After World War II there was a dramatic change in the number of
women in the workforce. The increased number of women with jobs outside of the home left
houses empty for longer periods of time during the day. This also meant that more people were
out in the community and coming into contact with others, thus increasing the opportunity for
crime to occur. Cohen and Felson developed three elements that are all required for a crime to
occur, including a 1) motivated offender that comes in contact with a 2) suitable target in the 3)
absence of a capable guardian. If one of these three elements is absent, opportunities for crime
decrease.
Upon further development of the three main components of routine activities theory,
Felson and Cohen (1980) describe a motivated offender as having “criminal inclinations and the
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ability to carry out those inclinations” (Felson and Cohen, 1980, p.392). Having the intentions to
commit crime is not enough but the offender must also have the means to act on their intentions.
In describing a suitable target, Felson and Cohen develop four key elements: Value, Visibility,
Access and Inertia. Value represents the symbolic importance of the target while visibility is the
likelihood that the offender will be caught by law enforcement. Access measures the availability
of routes to and from the target and inertia measures the factors that impact the difficulty to
commit crime. Finally, capable guardians are able to oversee and protect potential targets (Felson
and Cohen, 1980).

Crime Pattern Theory
A third influential theory under the umbrella of environmental criminology is
Brantingham and Brantingham’s (1990) theory of crime patterns. Building from the assumptions
of both rational choice and routine activities, the authors argue that crime does not occur
randomly but instead occurs in patterns of concentrated areas. These areas of crime are defined
as the place where the activity space of a motivated offender intersects with a target location.
Activity spaces are common areas such as home, work or other commonly traveled areas such as
shopping centers (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1990).
Brantingham and Brantingham argue that just like nonoffenders, criminal offenders move
in routine patterns to similar places throughout their day. The surrounding areas an offender
encounters on their movement from place to place is known as the offender’s awareness space.
While moving throughout their day, offenders become exposed to opportunities to commit
crimes within their awareness space. These areas where offenders come into contact with
opportunities to commit crimes are where crime is likely to occur. As such, areas outside of the
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routine movements of offenders are less likely to be areas of criminal activities (Brantingham
and Brantingham, 1990; Eck and Weisburd, 2015).
Situational Crime Prevention
Building on the assumptions of rational choice, routine activities, and crime pattern
theories, Ronald Clarke (1980) developed an application of these theories known as situational
crime prevention (SCP), with the ultimate goal of reducing the opportunity of crime. Similar to
that of Cohen and Felson (1979), Clarke critiques the scope of traditional theories of crime in
that they are focused heavily on the dispositions or motivations to commit crime rather than the
choices made by an offender when presented with the opportunity to commit crime. Thus,
situational crime prevention is focused more on the setting(s) of opportunities of crime rather
than the motivation of those committing crime. SCP places less emphasis of crime prevention by
way of the criminal justice system and focuses more on the surrounding built environment. For
example, adding security monitoring systems to businesses or placing bars on windows are
measures that private citizens can implement to reduce opportunities for crime (Clarke, 1997).
In further developing his strategy, Cornish and Clarke (2003) argues that situational
crime prevention seeks to reduce crime by making the commission of crime less attractive. They
propose that this is done in five ways: (1) increasing the difficulty of crime, (2) increasing the
risk of getting caught, (3) reducing the rewards of offending, (4) by removing excuses for
offending, (5) reducing temptations and provocations of committing crime. With each of these
five strategies, Cornish and Clarke developed five direct techniques which became known as the
25 techniques of situational crime prevention. Current research on crime displacement has shown
situational crime prevention to be an effective application to reducing crime (Guerette and
Bowers, 2009; Weisburd et al., 2006).
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Situational Crime Prevention and Terrorism
Traditionally, situational crime prevention has been focused on routine forms of street
crime, however, in their book “Outsmarting the Terrorist” Clarke and Newman (2006) call for
the application of situational crime prevention to terrorism. While the motivation between
criminals committing typical offenses (e.g., burglary, assault, etc.) and those committing terrorist
attacks might vary drastically, Clarke and Newman argue that the core tenets of environmental
criminology are also applicable to terrorism prevention.
Previous research comparing terrorism and other crimes has focused on five main
differences: (1) the motivations for crime and terrorism are vastly different, (2) terrorists are
much more determined than criminals, (3) terrorism requires much more planning and is less
opportunistic than most crime, (4) terrorism depends on external funding, and (5) terrorism
involves much larger-scale acts and can only be committed by organized groups (Clarke and
Newman, 2006). Clarke and Newman argue against these differences, suggesting that the
differences between terrorism and other crimes are actually few. They claim many terrorists are
motivated by peer pressure or a sense of belonging, similar to other forms of crimes. They also
argue that planning is no less complicated for terrorism attacks as sophisticated robberies, as they
both rely heavily on planning and preparation. Finally, terrorism is not always large scale, as
many attacks are on individuals or small groups as is traditional crimes and terrorists often turn
to traditional crimes to secure their own funds rather than relying on external funding (Clarke
and Newman, 2006).
Clarke and Newman identify four pillars of the terrorism opportunity structure: targets,
weapons, tools and facilitating conditions. Examples of targets include a seemingly endless
number of places/people such as government facilities, businesses, or individuals that appear
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attractive to attack. Not all potential targets appear equally attractive to terrorists, therefore it is
unnecessary and practically impossible to equally protect all targets with situational crime
prevention strategies. Instead, the most vulnerable targets need to be identified and prevention
strategies focused towards them.
Weapons play a vital role in both the availability of opportunities and types of potential
targets terrorists can feasibly attack. The method of attack and the potential destruction of their
ideological crime are in large part dependent on the weapon used. Weapon choice can depend on
the level of resources available to the individual or terrorist organization as well as the level of
knowledge it takes to use certain weapons. For example, improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
require a certain skill set to build and detonate in comparison to other weapons such as
handguns. Clarke and Newman (2006) argue that the most important feature of weapon choice is
how easily obtainable it is. This helps explain why small arms and improvised explosives are
popular among terrorists, because they are relatively easy to obtain. Reducing the availability of
certain weapons is one step that law enforcement can take in reducing opportunities of terrorist
attacks.
While targets and weapons are the two primary pillars of terrorist opportunity, tools and
facilitating conditions play a less, but sill important role. Tools include everyday items such as
vehicles, identification badges or credit cards that are needed to carry out the planned attack.
While these items are necessary in everyday life, Clarke and Newman argue that most of the
tools are gathered through illegal means. If law enforcement can intercept terrorists as they are
illegally collecting tools or make them less easily obtainable, they can in theory reduce
opportunities of attack. Finally, facilitating conditions are certain societal conditions that
generate favorable opportunities for crime. For example, policies, or a lack thereof, on firearm
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controls are a facilitating condition shaping opportunities to gather firearms for an attack. Similar
to targets, it is impossible to address and manage every facilitating condition. Identifying critical
conditions that are amenable to change while providing the most preventative benefits is critical
for counterterrorism efforts (Clarke and Newman, 2006).
Criminologists have begun to apply situational crime prevention to specific crimes
including terrorism. Clark (2009) examined the threat of bioterrorism attacks within the United
States. He focused on weapons as a pillar of opportunity and concludes that the threat of
biological weapons being used against the United States is minimal as it is extremely difficult to
develop and unlikely to be used in a mass casualty attack (Clark, 2009). In another study, Yun
(2009) focuses on another of the four pillars, examining how situational factors influence
international terrorist organizations to commit kidnappings. Researchers have also applied
situational crime prevention to violent attacks comparing suicide and non-suicide attacks and
assassinations (Gruenewald et al., 2018; Mandala and Freilich, 2017). Not all terrorism incidents
examined through a situational crime prevention framework are violent in nature, as Belli and
Freilich (2009) apply this approach to non-violent tax related crimes committed by the extreme
far-right.

Target Selection
Previous research on target selection in the context of terrorism has been focused on four
main characteristics: vulnerability/risk assessment, ideology, group structure, and the planning
process.
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Vulnerability/Risk Assessment
The first pillar of opportunity that Clarke and Newman (2006) discuss is target selection.
While most people or places could theoretically be a target of a potential attack, it is impractical
to be able to protect all targets. Instead, they argue priority needs to be given to targets that
appear more attractive to terrorists and thus are at a higher risk of being selected for an attack. In
order to better understand what makes an attractive target, Clarke and Newman (2006) developed
the acronym EVIL DONE encompassing target attributes: Exposed, Vital, Iconic, Legitimate,
Destructible, Occupied, Near and Easy. Each feature of a specific location is given a score and
targets with a higher score are seen as more vulnerable and attractive to future attacks than those
with a lower score (Clarke and Newman, 2006).
Boba (2009) further expanded Clarke and Newman’s conceptualization of EVIL DONE,
by developing a measurement scheme to assess the level of risk to individual targets. More
specifically, she created a 5-point scale for each of the EVIL DONE features. The combination
of scores from each of the features provides the overall vulnerability score for each individual
target (Boba 2009). More recently, researchers have used Boba’s scale in measuring the
attractiveness of targets across different ideologies and places. For example, EVIL DONE
measures have been used to assess the attractiveness of targets selected by eco-terrorists in the
United States (Gruenewald et al., 2015). In addition, Ecki and colleagues (2008) applied the
EVIL DONE model to targets in Istanbul, Turkey.
Ideology
Research has shown ideology to be an important contributing factor in regards to target
selection (Ahmed, 2018; Asal et al., 2009; Drake, 1998; Hoffman, 1998). As a result of this,
criminologists have begun to apply situational crime prevention, focusing specifically on a single
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ideological category or comparing two major ideological categories. For example, researchers
have applied situational crime prevention focusing only on the extreme far-right movement
(Belli and Freilich, 2009; Klein et al., 2016) and eco-terrorists. Gruenewald also compared
incident factors between far-right and Islamic extremists (Gruenewald et al., 2018). Focusing on
a single ideology or comparison between two ideologies allows for scholars to identify other
potential factors influencing target selection within certain ideological groups or compared
across groups.
Group Structure and Plan Cycle
The size and structure of terrorist groups can influence the amount of resources and
knowledge applied to a terrorist plot. Focusing on lone wolf terrorists, Becker (2014) finds that,
in comparison to larger organizations, lone wolfs are restricted by the weapons they have
available to use. While the majority of terrorist organizations use explosives to commit attacks,
lone wolfs predominately relied on firearms. This has a direct impact on the type of targets being
selected based in part on the level of destruction that can be caused with the available weapons
(Becker, 2014). While examining leadership roles amongst militant groups in the Middle East
and Northern Africa, Abrahams and Potter (2015) found that militant groups with leadership
deficiencies were more likely to target civilians than those with more centralized leadership and
organized command. These studies demonstrate the importance of group structure and how it can
impact the targets that terrorists select to attack.
The planning process is another important factor when considering target selection. In
examining auto-biographies of terrorists, Gill and colleagues (2018) examine factors of decision
making when it comes to planning and committing incidents. Their findings suggest variance in
the planning process are a result of the complexity of the planned attack as well as their
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awareness of counterterrorism efforts. For example, one offender considered himself an “alert
opportunist” only “half-looking for vulnerable targets” while another offender spent a much
longer time planning his attacks, whom “never stopped looking for military targets” (Gill et al.,
2018 p.3)
Based on the review of the current literature, there are a few gaps in the research that the
current study seeks to fill. When examining target selection by terrorists, prior research has
generally focused on predicting how target selection influences the ultimate success of incidents.
There has yet to be a study that seeks to predict target type as the outcome variable, measuring
how the background and situational factors vary across target types. In addition, most studies on
target selection focus on factors shaping the decision-making process independently, while there
is less known about how these variables and factors operate in combination within particular
contexts. I also concur with Morris (2015) who suggests there is limited research that examines
the environmental factors that make targets appear more attractive and vulnerable to terrorist
attack. The current study seeks to add to the growing body of research on terrorist target
selection by examining how situational and other environmental factors shape target selection
across extreme far-right and Islamic extremists’ plots.
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CHAPTER THREE
Current Study
Using situational crime prevention as a guiding framework, the purpose of this study is to
examine the situational characteristics that shape target selection of terrorist attacks in the United
States. In addition, I will compare situational factors shaping target selection decision-making for
terrorists associated with the extreme far-right and Islamic extremism, as they currently pose the
most serious threat to the United States. The current study will seek to answer two main
questions:

Research Question 1 - How do situational factors and target-specific attributes of
attractiveness shape terrorists’ target selection?
Research Question 1a - How do particular combinations of situational factors and
measures of target attractiveness shape terrorists’ target selection?

Using situational crime prevention as a guiding framework, the current study seeks to
answer the research questions with the five main hypotheses related to how target selection is
shaped by situational incident characteristics. While measures of target attractiveness are
included within the study to explore the relationship with target selection, I have not included
them in the hypotheses as there is little prior research to help guide my research expectations.
H1 Islamic extremists are more likely to select government than citizenry targets in
comparison to far-right extremists.
H1a Islamic extremists are more likely to select human targets than non-human targets in
comparison to far-right extremists.
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H2 The higher the weapon sophistication used, the more likely terrorists will select a
government target instead of citizenry.
H2a The higher the weapon sophistication used, the more likely terrorists will select a
human target than non-human target.
H3 Groups are more likely to select government targets than citizenry targets in
comparison to terrorists operating alone.
H3a Groups are more likely to select human targets than non- human targets in
comparison to terrorists operating alone.
H4 The longer the planning cycle, the more likely terrorists will select a government
target instead of citizenry.
H4a The longer the planning cycle, the more likely terrorists will select a human target
instead of a non-human target.
H5 The longer the distance traveled to the target, the more likely terrorists will select a
government target instead of citizenry.
H5a The longer the distance traveled to target, the more likely terrorists will select a
human target instead of a non-human target.

Data from the American Terrorism Study (ATS)
This project will utilize data from the American Terrorism Study (ATS) housed in the
Terrorism Research Center at the University of Arkansas. The ATS is an open-source database
that contains information on terrorism-related criminal cases in which individuals are indicted in
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a United States federal court. Information is systematically collected from court records that have
either been gathered directly from court record repositories across the country or digitally
through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system. Supplemental
information on terrorists and their crimes is also gathered from online news sources.
Incidents are defined in this study as any failed, foiled or completed attack within the
United States in which an individual (or group) took one or more preparatory steps toward the
commission of the planned terrorist act. Threats to commit a terrorist attack are not considered an
incident of terrorism unless they are linked to an observable preparatory step by perpetrators
(e.g., conducting surveillance, purchasing weapons) as evidenced in court records. While there
are debates within the terrorism literature on how to define terrorism (Borum 2014; Ganor, 2002;
Sedgwick, 2010; Kundnani, 2012), only terrorism incidents adhering to the FBI’s definition of
domestic terrorism are included in the ATS. The FBI defines domestic terrorism as:
“use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating
entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population,
or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives. (FBI, 2005, p. V)
To date, the American Terrorism Study includes data on over 500 failed, foiled or
completed incidents dating back to 1980. In order to measure situational factors associated with
target selection, only incidents with known target locations were included, thus reducing the
sample to 440 unique incidents. This eliminated incidents where the specific target is unknown.
An example would be when a perpetrator is indicted for making plans to attack a mosque but a
specific mosque is never identified. Therefore, the exact target is unknown and is not included in
the sample. The sample was then reduced even further to account for the ideological categories
of far-right and Islamic extremists. From this, the sample of 211 unique incidents committed by
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far-right or Islamic extremists with identified target locations ranging from 1980 to current was
generated.
For the current study, several situational and event-level characteristics of terrorism
incidents, including weapon type, group status, and the length of terrorist planning cycle were
collected from ATS incidents. In addition, levels of perceived attractiveness and vulnerability of
the selected targets are measured. To examine how terrorist’s geospatial proximity to targets
might shape their decision-making, information on residential and target locations was collected
and geocoded, thus allowing for distance traveled to be measured. These results might shape
insight on terrorist decision-making. The following section provides more in-depth details on
how each of the variables in the study are measured.
Dependent Variable
The primary dependent variable for the study the type of target selected by terrorists. One
issue that arises from previous research is the vast array of target type measures. As there is no
clear and concise way to best measure target type, the current study explores two unique and
separate ways of measuring target type: Government/Citizenry targets and Human/Non-human
targets.
Government targets are those that are owned or operated by the federal, state or local
government such as federal buildings, court houses and military bases. Citizenry targets are those
that are not owned or operated by the government, but are privately owned or operated, and
include targets such as businesses, media outlets and religious institutions. Attacks against
individuals are considered citizenry targets as well. The second target types outcomes of interest
include human and non-human targets. Human targets are a result of any attack that injures or
kills at least one individual. Incidents that were foiled before they could occur were assessed
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whether the purpose of the attack was to injure/kill civilians. While certain incidents may have
occurred at a building such as a business or government office, if the intended target was the
civilians inside the building and not the physical structure itself, it was coded as human targets.
As such, non-human targets are those that did not injure/kill anyone or had no purpose in doing
so and were focused solely on the physical structure. For example, vandalism of a historical
statue or destruction of a religious building are attacks against non-human targets.
Independent Variables
Weapon Sophistication
The first independent variable included is weapon sophistication. Following the work of
previous ATS research (Smith et al., 2016), weapon sophistication is coded as an ordinal
measure ranging from low (0), moderate (1), and high (2) levels of sophistication. Weapon
sophistication measures the availability of weapons in combination with the level of knowledge
required to build (if necessary) and operate the specific weapon. Weapons of low sophistication
are easily accessed by the public and require little to no knowledge to operate them (e.g.,
baseball bats, knives, etc.). Moderate sophistication includes weapons that take some skill,
training, or previous handling to operate (e.g., firearms and vehicles). High sophistication
weapons are those that are not easily accessible and require above average skills to build and/or
operate, such as improvised explosive devices (IED) or biological weapons. Terrorism incidents
that involve multiple weapons are coded for the weapon type that has the highest level of
sophistication.
Length of Planning Process
The length of the planning process is included as a key independent variable to capture
how long terrorists plan and prepare before executing an attack. The planning process is an
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interval measure available in the ATS that codes the number of days from date of the first
preparatory event to the date of the executed incident or when it was planned to occur. Previous
studies have grouped interval measures of the planning process into ordinal categories (Smith et
al., 2016). This approach is adopted in the current study as well.
Terrorist Group Structure
Terrorist group structure captures the number of people involved in planning, preparing
and committing the incident. Loners are those actors that acted completely alone, having no help
with the planning or committing of the incident. While they may be affiliated with a known
terrorist organization, they had no help with any stage of the incident process. Groups are those
terrorists that operated with 2 or more people, either within the planning process or committing
the actual incident.
Distance to Target
The final independent variable is distance to target, which measures how far (in miles)
the preparator(s) traveled or were planning to travel from their residence to a target location.
Addresses of both perpetrator residences and target locations are collected and geo-coded in the
ATS along with their respective latitude and longitude coordinates. Using Google Maps, each
perpetrator residence and target location are mapped and distances from perpetrator residence to
the corresponding target locations are calculated. For incidents that have multiple perpetrators
involved, and thus have multiple residences linked to a single incident, the average distance
traveled is calculated to produce a single measure. Distance to target is then recoded into a
dichotomous variable: 30 miles or less and 31 or more miles to provide cohesion with the other
independent variables.
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Target Attractiveness
The final group of variables seek to measure the attractiveness for each target selected by
terrorists. As discussed previously, Clarke and Newman (2006) introduced EVIL DONE as an
acronym for describing the attributes of potential terrorist targets. The current study will only
focus on four measures proposed by Clarke and Newman: Exposed, Vital, Destructible and
Occupied.
Exposed measures the accessibility of the potential target to the public. Accessible targets
are those that are open to the public either day or night without special permission or access. As
such, inaccessible targets are those that require some form or permission or special access and
are not available for visitation by the general public. Vital measures how important a target is to
the functioning of everyday operations of the specific organization. Vital targets would not allow
the organization to function in its day-to-day activities whereas non-vital targets would still be
able to operate. For example, a courthouse would be a vital target as the court system of that
particular city would be greatly impacted if destroyed. Destructible measures how easily the
target can be destroyed in an attack. Targets that can be destroyed by conventional weapons
and/or firearms would be considered easily destructible. Larger targets that would require a
single or multiple explosive device to destroy are coded as difficult to destroy. Occupied
measures the level of potential victims present within a target site, either unoccupied or
occupied.
Analytical Strategy
The first type of analysis that is used is bivariate analysis, including chi-square tests to
examine how the relationship of situational and background factors compare across target types
for both far-right and Islamic incidents. In addition, binary logistic regression is used to assess
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the statistical relationship between each independent variable and the binary-coded outcome
variables, net the effects of all other independent variables.
It is recognized that traditional bivariate and multivariate regression models are limited
by considering the effects of independent in isolation when it is possible (and likely) that factors
shaping target selection operate in combination with one another. To address this concern, the
study supplements the bivariate and multivariate models with Conjunctive Analysis of Case
Configurations (or “conjunctive analysis”) to examine how particular configurational profiles of
independent variables are more or less associated with particular types of targets.
Conjunctive analysis, first introduced into criminology by Meithe, Hart and Regoeczi
(2008), explores the probability of particular independent variables across the dependent
variable. Conjunctive analysis creates a matrix table or truth table for all possible configurations
of each variable, with a dichotomous dependent variable. If a strong relationship exists amongst
the possible combinations, then the identified combinations will be clustered together rather than
spread across all of the potential configurations. This helps identify which configurations are
more or less likely to occur within the given dataset.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Results
This chapter presents the results of the current study. The first section begins with
descriptive statistics for all variables that were included in one or more of the analyses. The
second section provides results from the bivariate analysis, including the statistical relationship
between each independent and dependent variable. Third, a description of findings from the
multivariate analyses using binary logistic regression follows. Fourth, and finally, findings are
presented from conjunctive analysis examining how ideology and key situational variables
operate in combination with one another to shape specific outcomes of interest.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays the frequency and percentages of all independent and dependent
variables. All variables for this analysis except for weapon type were binary coded. Missing data
was generally not an issue in this study, with data missing in less than 20 percent of cases for
most variables. Due to the challenges of identifying when terrorist plots originated (i.e., data of
first preparatory act) and limited publicly available information about these acts, data for terrorist
plan cycle are missing for 35 percent of cases.
Table 1 reveals that the majority of targets selected by terrorists in general were human
targets, while only 34 percent of targets were non-human targets. This is not too surprising as
one of the primary goals of terrorist attacks is to inflict as much damage and human casualties as
possible. There is less variation across government and citizen target types. Government targets
account for 51.5 percent of the selected targets, while citizen targets account for 48.5 percent of
all targets included in this study.
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Table 1. Frequency Distributions for all Variables
Variables
Ideology
Weapon Type

Group Structure
Plan Cycle
Distance to Target
Exposed
Vital
Destructible
Occupied
Human/Non-human
Government/Citizenry

Frequency
Far-right
120
Islamic Extremist
91
Low Sophistication
53
Moderate Sophistication
48
High Sophistication
93
Loner
86
Group
122
0 – 90 days
60
91+ days
78
30 miles or less
109
31+ miles
67
Accessible
143
Inaccessible
61
Vital
130
Non-Vital
74
Easily Destructible
115
Difficult to Destroy
88
Unoccupied
57
Occupied
141
Human
139
Non-human
72
Government
104
Citizenry
98

%
56.9
43.1
27.3
24.7
47.9
41.3
58.7
43.5
56.5
61.9
38.1
70.1
29.9
63.7
36.3
56.7
43.3
28.8
71.2
65.9
34.1
51.5
48.5

Figure 1 displays the temporal variation of all terrorism incidents included in the current
study (n=211). The years of terrorism incidents range from 1983 to 2019 and are grouped in 5year increments. The overall trend shows an increase in the number of incidents since the 1980s.
The number of incidents remains fairly stable through the mid 90’s, followed by sharp increases
in the early 2000’s and into the 2010’s. The number of incidents reaches its peak in 2009 – 2013
and slightly declines into the later 2010’s. Due to how cases are coded in the ATS, the sample
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does not include all incidents in 2019. In addition, because terrorism incidents are not added to
the ATS until cases are closed, findings for more recent cases should be interpreted with caution.

n=57
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Number of Incidents

50
n=40
40

n=35

30
20

n=22
n=18

n=20

n=19

1988 - 1993

1994 - 1998
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0
1983 - 1987

1999 - 2003

2004 - 2008

2009 - 2013

2014 - 2019

Years

Figure 1. Number of Terrorist Incidents Across Time
Bivariate Analysis
Since each of the independent variables are categorical and the dependent variable is
coded dichotomously, cross tabs and associated chi-square tests were run to test for statistical
significance across target types. Table 2 displays the results for each independent variable across
government targets and citizenry targets. Examining the situational variables, ideology and
weapon type had a significant relationship with target type (p ≤ 0.05). While the majority of farright incidents (56.8%) were against citizens, the opposite occurs for Islamic extremist incidents,
as 63.1 percent were against government targets, providing some initial support for Hypothesis 1.
Supportive of Hypothesis 2, findings show that as sophistication of weapons increases, the
likelihood that terrorists will select government targets compared to citizenry targets also
increases. Low sophisticated weapons are more common among citizenry targets (64.7%), while
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moderate (52.5%) and high sophisticated weapons (57.3%) are relatively more associated with
government targets. Findings in Table 2 also indicate that the majority of terrorists who operate
alone (59%) selected government targets, while those operating in groups chose to target
citizens, though differences were not statistically significant. In addition, incidents that occurred
30 miles or less from the perpetrator’s residence were most commonly associated with
government targets (59.2%), though the opposite was true for those that occurred 31+ miles
away. The relationship between distance traveled and target type was statistically significant at
the p ≤ 0.01 level, but in the opposite direction as expected, thus failing to support Hypothesis 5 at
the bivariate level. Drawing from crime pattern theory, it would be expected that within the
shorter distance of their routine movements, terrorists are more likely to come in contact with
citizen targets more often than government targets. However, the results from the bivariate
analysis did not support the expected results.
Shifting to measures of target attractiveness, measures of exposure and destructibility
were significantly related to target selection, whereas vital and occupied measures were not. As
expected, targets accessible to the public were predominately citizen targets, whereas those
deemed inaccessible to the public were government targets. A similar pattern is evident with
destructibility. The majority of targets that are the easiest to destroy were those associated with
citizens (55%), while those that are difficult to destroy more often reflected government targets
(60%). Importantly, bivariate analyses reveal variation in target attractiveness measures,
suggesting that not all government targets are inaccessible or difficult to destroy, while the
opposite is not always true of citizenry targets.
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Table 2. Bivariate Findings Across Government and Citizenry Targets
Government
Citizenry
Variable
(n)
%
(n)

%

Total

Ideology **
n=202

Far-right
Islamic extremist

51
53

43.2
63.1

67
31

56.8
36.9

118
84

Weapon Type *

18

35.3

33

64.7

51

n=186

Low Sophistication
Moderate
Sophistication
High Sophistication

24
51

52.2
57.3

22
38

47.8
42.7

46
89

Group Structure ±
n=199

Loner
Group

49
54

59.0
46.6

34
62

41.0
53.4

83
116

Plan Cycle
n=135

0 – 90 days
91+ days

27
39

46.6
50.6

31
38

53.4
49.4

58
77

Distance to Target
±
n=169

30 miles or less
31+ miles

61
30

59.2
45.5

42
36

40.8
54.0

103
66

Exposed **
n=195

Accessible
Inaccessible

54
46

39.4
79.3

83
12

60.6
20.0

137
58

Vital
n=196

Vital
Non-Vital

66
37

53.2
51.4

58
35

46.8
48.6

124
72

Destructible *
n=194

Easily Destructible
Difficult to Destroy

49
51

45.0
60.0

60
34

55.0
40.0

109
85

Occupied

Unoccupied

27

50.0

27

50.0

54

n=189

Occupied

71

52.6

64

47.4

135

± p ≤ 0.1, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01

Table 3 displays bivariate results for each independent variable across human and nonhuman targets. Situational variables, including ideology, weapon type, group structure and plan
cycle significantly vary (p ≤ 0.01) across the target type. Far-right terrorists fairly evenly selected
human and non-human targets, while Islamic extremists more commonly targeted human targets
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(89%), indicating some initial support for Hypothesis 1a. As expected, (Hypothesis 2a), low
sophisticated weapons were most commonly used against non-human targets, while moderate
and high sophisticated weapons, such as firearms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), were
predominately used to target humans to cause injuries and casualties. Human targets include
attacks against facilities with the intent of targeting the civilians inside the building and not
simply the physical structure itself. Non-human targets are solely structural attacks, such as
vandalism of religious symbols or destruction of abortion clinics and therefore often rely on less
sophisticated weapons. Of incidents that were perpetrated by groups, 74.6 percent were against
human targets, as expected (Hypothesis 3a). The shorter plan cycles (0 – 90 days) were evenly
distributed at 50 percent across human and non-human targets, while the longer plan cycles (91+
days) were most common amongst human targets (78.2%), thus supporting Hypothesis 4a. Since
there is no significant statistical difference between distance to target and target type amongst
human and non-human targets, the findings fail to provide initial support for Hypothesis 5a.
Instead, target exposure was the only significant measure of attractiveness to vary significantly
across human and non-human targets (p ≤ 0.01).

Table 3. Bivariate Findings Across Human and Non-human Targets
Human
Non-Human
Variable
(n)
%
(n)
Ideology **
Far-right
58
48.3
62
n=211
Islamic Extremist
81
89.0
10
Weapon Type **
n=194

Low Sophistication
Moderate Sophistication
High Sophistication

24
38
66

29

45.3
79.2
71.0

29
10
27

%
51.7
11.0

Total
120
91

54.7
20.8
29.0

53
48
93

Table 3. Bivariate Findings Across Human and Non-human Targets (Cont.)1
Human
Non-Human
Variable
(n)
%
(n)

%

Total

Group Structure **
n=208

Loner
Group

46
91

53.5
74.6

40
31

46.5
25.4

86
122

Plan Cycle **
n=138

0 – 90 days
91+ days

30
61

50.0
78.2

30
17

50.0
21.8

60
78

Distance to Target
n=176

30 miles or less
31+ miles

68
45

62.4
67.2

41
22

37.6
32.8

109
67

Exposed **
n=204

Accessible
Inaccessible

84
49

58.7
80.3

59
12

41.3
19.7

143
61

Vital
n=204

Vital
Non-Vital

89
46

68.5
62.2

41
28

31.5
37.8

130
74

Destructible
n=203

Easily Destructible
Difficult to Destroy

76
60

66.1
68.2

39
28

33.9
31.8

115
88

Occupied

Unoccupied

0

0.0

57

100.0

57

n=198

Occupied

130

92.2

11

7.8

141

± p ≤ 0.1, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01

Multivariate Analysis
The next step was to examine how each situational measure and target attractiveness
characteristic were statistically associated with terrorist target selection, net the effects of other
factors, using multivariate analyses. Table 4 displays the results of the binary logistic regression
models, predicting government versus citizenry terrorist target selection. The model includes all
of the situational variables that were found to be significant in the bivariate analysis. 2 The

The occupied measure was not included in the analysis because of its near perfect statistical relationship with the
outcome of interest.
2 Due to the exploratory nature of the study and relatively small sample size, multivariate analyses only include
independent variables that were found to be statistically significant at the bivariate level.
1
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statistically significant target attractiveness characteristics were also added to the model to test
the effects of each independent variable, while controlling for all other variables.3
Table 4. Predicting Target Type (Government vs. Citizenry) Using Binary Logistic Regression

Variables
b(SE)
Exp(B)
Situational Factors
Group Actors1
0.918 (.454)*
2.504
High Sophistication Weapons2
-0.886 (.437)*
0.412
Long Distance to Target (31+ miles)3
0.581 (.398)
1.787
Islamic extremist4
-0.671 (.408) ±
0.511
Significant Target Attractiveness Factors
Inaccessible5
-1.825 (.491) **
0.161
Difficult to Destroy6
-0.029 (.452)
0.971
Constant
.416 (.343)
1.516
R-Square
0.256
-2 Log likelihood
166.297
± p ≤ 0.1, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01
Reference Categories: 1 Lone Actors, 2 Low/Mod Sophisticated Weapons, 3 Short Distance to
Target (30 miles or less), 4 Far-right extremist, 5 Accessible, 6 Easily Destructible

Beginning with the situational incident characteristics, group actors significantly varied
with the type of terrorist target selection (p ≤ 0.05). The positive statistical relationship indicates
that groups were more likely to select citizenry targets in comparison to lone actors, thus failing
to support Hypothesis 3. Government targets are typically more secure in comparison to citizenry
targets and therefore would require more resources and planning to successfully attack. Since
group actors have more combined resources than those acting alone, situational crime prevention
would suggest that groups would then have more available opportunities to attack more fortified
targets, however this did not appear to be the case. Instead, this relationship could be a result of a
relatively small number of terrorist groups that targeted private citizens in spree attacks. For

3

Model diagnostic tests indicated that multicollinearity was not an issue across multivariate models.
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example, in the 1980’s a group known as the Nation of Yahweh targeted individuals who
opposed their ideology in a number of planned attacks.
Highly sophisticated weapons were also a significant predictor (p ≤ 0.05) of government
and citizen targets. As weapon sophistication increased, the likelihood of selecting citizenry
targets decreased, showing support for Hypothesis 2, aligning with the bivariate results. High
sophisticated weapons are more likely to be associated with government targets rather than
citizen targets in comparison to low sophisticated weapons. Government targets often have
higher levels of security measures for protection in comparison to citizen targets. It would
require stronger, more sophisticated weapons such as explosives in order to combat these more
advanced security measures. Therefore, it is likely that reasoning terrorists are more likely to
select government targets rather than citizen targets when more sophisticated weapons and
suitable opportunities are available to them.
As shown in Table 4, incidents perpetrated by Islamic extremists are statistically and
negatively associated with target selection (p ≤ 0.1). This means that Islamic extremists are more
likely to select government targets than citizenry targets compared to far-right extremists, which
is supportive of Hypothesis 1. Distance to target was not a significant predictor of target
selection, thus failing to support Hypothesis 5. Of target attractiveness measures that were added
to the model, exposure is strongly significant (p ≤ 0.01) at predicting government or citizen
targets. Targets that are unexposed, or inaccessible to the public, are more likely to associated
with government targets compared to those that are relatively more accessible to the public. This
could be indicative that government targets more often require special permissions or access
badges to enter which are not given to the public. While statistically significant in the bivariate
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analysis, destructibility is not statistically significant in the multivariate analysis for this
particular outcome variable.
Table 5 displays the results of the binary logistic regression model predicting human and
non-human target selection by terrorists. Similar to the previous model, Table 5 includes all of
the situational and target attractiveness measures found to be statistically significant in previous
bivariate analyses.

Table 5. Predicting Target Type (Human vs Non-Human) Using Binary Logistic Regression

Variables
b(SE)
Exp(B)
Situational Factors
Group Actors1
-0.556 (.509)
0.573
High Sophisticated Weapons2
1.008 (.576) ±
2.741
Long Plan Cycle 3
-1.905 (.572) **
0.149
Islamic Extremist4
-3.398 (.742) **
0.033
Significant Target Attractiveness Factors
Inaccessible5
-0.211 (.732)
0.81
Constant
1.2 (.467)
3.321
R-Square
0.485
-2 Log likelihood
106.506
± p ≤ 0.1, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01
Reference Categories: 1 Lone Actors, 2 Low/Mod Sophisticated Weapons, 3 Short plan cycle
4Far-right extremist, 5 Accessible
Beginning with the situational incident variables, ideology (p ≤ 0.01) and plan cycle (p ≤
0.01) were significant predictors of human versus non-human target types. Specifically, Islamic
extremists were more likely to select human targets than non-human targets in comparison to farright extremist, as expected (Hypothesis 1a). This makes sense since Islamic extremists often
target people who do not adhere to their specific religious beliefs in mass casualty attacks.
Similar to the results from bivariate analysis, findings from multivariate analysis indicate that the
longer the length of terrorists’ planning cycle, the more likely terrorists would select human
33

targets in comparison to non-human targets, thus supporting Hypothesis 4a. It is assumed that
like other criminals, terrorists are rational beings that weigh the costs and benefits when planning
an attack to reduce the likelihood of being caught by law enforcement. Attacks against human
targets typically require more sophisticated plots to have successful outcomes in comparison to
attacks against non-human targets. All other variables are either significant only at the p ≤ 0.1
level or are not statistically significant. Therefore, hypotheses related to weapon type target type
fail to support Hypothesis 2a. Moreover, unlike the previous model predicting government
versus citizen target selection, target exposure was not a significant predictor of human versus
non-human target selection.
Conjunctive Analysis
The final form of analysis was conjunctive analysis of case configurations (CACC) to
examine which combinations of variables were most associated with the selection of particular
types of targets by terrorists. While binary logistic regression is useful for revealing how each
independent variable is statistically related to target selection outcomes, CACC indicates how
ideological and situational variables operate in combination to shape terrorist decision-making.
As in the previous analysis, only the variables that were significant in bivariate analysis were
included in CACC. In addition, and following prior terrorism research based on limited samples
(Gruenewald et al., 2019), only outcomes with five or more cases were included in the analysis.
Table 6 displays the results of CACC across government and citizenry targets. Some
combinations were associated with a very high likelihood of terrorists selecting citizens as their
target. For example, case profile 1 displayed that incidents committed by lone acting far-right
offenders often used moderately sophisticated weapons and traveled greater than 31 miles select
targets that were both accessible and easy to destroy which resulted in 100 percent citizenry

34

targets. Other configurations were associated with a very high likelihood of terrorists selecting
government targets. For example, profile 11 displays the combination that resulted in 0 percent
citizenry targets or, in other words, 100 percent government targets. The combination of factors
was almost the complete opposite of those selecting citizenry targets. Indeed, these incidents
were committed by Islamic extremist groups that used highly sophisticated weapons and traveled
less than 30 miles to targets that were inaccessible to the public and difficult to destroy. Being
able to recognize the patterns of factors associated with government and citizen targets allows
law enforcement to identify targets that are most at risk of future terrorist attacks.
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Table 6. Combinations of Target Type (Government vs Citizenry) Using Conjunctive Analysis
Case
Weapon
Group
Distance to
Profile
Ideology
Type
Structure
Exposed
Destructible
Target
1
Far-right
Moderate
Loner
Accessible
Easy
31+ miles
2
Far-right
Low
Loner
Inaccessible
Easy
≤ 30 miles
3
Far-right
High
Group
Accessible
Easy
≤ 30 miles
4
Far-right
High
Group
Accessible
Difficult
31+ miles
5
IE
High
Group
Accessible
Difficult
31+ miles
6
IE
High
Group
Accessible
Difficult
≤ 30 miles
7
Far-right
Low
Loner
Accessible
Easy
≤ 30 miles
8
IE
Moderate
Loner
Accessible
Easy
≤ 30 miles
9
Far-right
High
Loner
Accessible
Easy
31+ miles
10
IE
High
Group
Inaccessible
Difficult
31+ miles
11
IE
High
Group
Inaccessible
Difficult
≤ 30 miles
12
Far-right
High
Loner
Accessible
Easy
≤ 30 miles

*IE – Islamic
Extremist

% Citizenry
Target
100
100
86
83
50
43
40
20
20
20
0
0

# Cases
7
5
7
6
6
8
11
6
5
5
6
5

Case profile 7 displays the results for the most commonly occurring configuration
present within the data (n=11), including far-right lone actors with low weapon sophistication
that traveled less than 30 miles to targets that were both accessible and easy to destroy. This
particular case profile was associated with the selection of citizenry targets in 40 percent of
incidents. The change from moderately sophisticated weapons and distance greater than 30 miles
(Case Profile 1) to low sophisticated weapons and less than 30 miles (Case Profile 7) resulted in
a 60 percent decrease in selecting citizenry targets. This shows how changes in just two
situational factors can have a drastic impact on the likelihood of selecting citizenry targets over
government targets.
Combinations of factors that were most likely to result in selecting citizenry targets were
far-right perpetrators against targets that were easily destructible and accessible to the public.
Weapon type, distance to target and lone actor status varied across these case configurations. For
example, case profiles 1 thru 4 in Table 6 show the combinations most likely to result in
citizenry targets. Almost all of these configurations involved far-right extremists and accessible
and easy targets. Within these same configurations though, there was more variation across
weapon type, group structure, and distance to target.
While ideology was found to be a significant contributor while independent of other
factors in the bivariate and multivariate results, it was particularly relevant in combination with
other specific situational measures. When comparing case profiles 7 and 8 the combinations of
factors were similar except for ideology. The change from extreme far-right to Islamic extremist,
while all other factors remain the same, resulted in a 20 percent decrease in the chances of
selecting a citizenry target. Another example of this was present in case profiles 8 and 10. While
ideology remained the same, all other factors flip values. However, even with every factor
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changing, the likelihood of citizenry targets being selected by terrorists remains the same -- 20
percent, suggesting that even in combination of all other factors, ideology is a critical factor in
target selection.
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Table 7. Combinations of Target Type (Human vs Non-human) Using Conjunctive Analysis
Case
Weapon
Group
% Non-Human
Profile
Ideology
Type
Structure
Exposed
Plan Cycle
Target
1
Far-right
Low
Loner
Accessible
0 – 90 days
100
2
Far-right
High
Group
Accessible
0 – 90 days
80
3
Far-right
Low
Group
Accessible
0 – 90 days
67
4
Far-right
High
Loner
Accessible
91+ days
60
5
Far-right
High
Group
Accessible
91+ days
44
6
IE
High
Group
Inaccessible
91+ days
20
7
IE
High
Group
Accessible
91+ days
0
8
Far-right
Moderate
Loner
Accessible
91+ days
0
*IE – Islamic Extremist

# Cases
11
5
9
5
16
5
11
5
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Table 7 displays the results of CACC with human and non-human target types. Some
combinations resulted in a very high likelihood of selecting human targets, while other
combinations resulted in a high likelihood of selecting non-human targets. The combination of
extreme far-right lone actors with low sophisticated weapons that have a shorter plan cycle (0-90
days) and with targets that were accessible to the public resulted in 100 percent non-human
targets (Case Profile 1). On the other hand, Case Profile 7 reflects incidents committed by
Islamic extremist groups with highly sophisticated weapons and a longer plan cycle (91+ days)
against accessible targets that resulted in 100 percent human targets.
Interestingly, non-human targets are most commonly selected by far-right extremists that
used low sophisticated weapons with accessible targets. However, there was variation across
group structure, as both loners and groups were common among non-human targets. Human
targets were most commonly associated with high sophisticated weapons and group perpetrators
with accessible targets. Human target selection was relatively common amongst both extreme
far-right and Islamic extremists. CACC findings also revealed that non-human targets were most
commonly associated with a shorter plan cycle and low sophisticated weapons, whereas human
targets were associated with a longer plan cycle of 91 or more days and moderate/high
sophisticated weapons. This could be a result of the difficulty of planning a large-scale attack
with complex weaponry such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to maximize as much
casualties as possible.
Conjunctive analysis also revealed group structure is associated with target selection in
combination with other relevant factors. A change in group structure from loner to group
decreased the likelihood of selecting a non-human target. For example, case profile 1 and 3
shared the same combination of factors except for group structure. The change from lone actors
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(Case profile 1) to group actors (Case Profile 3) resulted in a 37 percent decrease in the
likelihood of selecting a non-human target. The same pattern was present when comparing case
profiles 4 and 5 as well. With all other factors remaining constant, the change in group structure
resulted in a 16 percent decrease in the likelihood of selecting non-human targets.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Discussion and Conclusion
Guided by the situational crime prevention framework, the purpose of this study was to
explore how the situational incident factors and target attractiveness characteristics influence
terrorist target selection. The following chapter begins by reviewing the key findings from the
study. Then addresses some implications for counterterrorism policy and practice. Finally,
limitations of the current study are addressed and suggestions for future research are posited.
Key Findings
This study assumed that terrorists are rational beings and make reasoned choices when
planning and preparing for an attack. It was also expected that several ideological and situational
factors impact target selection. Based on bivariate and multivariate findings, it appears that
ideology and weapon type were two of the most significant factors associated with target
selection by terrorists.
Findings from the bivariate and multivariate analysis were consistent with previous
findings that ideology influences terrorist target selection (Ahmed, 2018; Asal et al., 2009;
Drake, 1998; Hoffman, 1998). Islamic extremists were more likely to select government targets
than citizenry targets compared to far-right extremists. Also, Islamic extremists were more likely
to select human targets than non-human targets. These findings make sense considering that
Islamic extremists ultimately seek to weaken foreign governments and eliminate those who do
not adhere to fundamentalist versions of Islamic teachings.
The level of terrorists’ weapon sophistication also significantly influences target selection
decisions. Highly sophisticated weapons are more likely to be used against government and
human targets rather than citizens and non-human targets in comparison to moderately and least
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sophisticated weapons. Clarke and Newman (2006) identify weapons as one of the four pillars of
the terrorist opportunity structure, suggesting that weapons are dependent on the level of
resources available to the terrorist(s) and are indicative of the level of destruction that can be
caused. Higher sophisticated weapons, while requiring more knowledge to use and effort to
obtain, can cause significantly more damage than lower sophisticated weapons. When selecting a
target, terrorists also consider the amount of death and destruction that is possible. In order to
maximize the amount of death and destruction, terrorists may utilize highly sophisticated
weapons, such as IEDs, against targets involving humans rather than non-human or structural
targets. Government targets are often more secure and protected than citizenry targets and
therefore terrorists are more likely to use highly sophisticated weapons to overcome these
protective measures.
Several other situational factors included in the current study were expected to play an
important role in terrorists’ target decision-making process, but these hypotheses were not
supported by the statistical models. Previous research on group structure has found it to have a
significant impact on target selection (Abrahams and Potter, 2015; Becker, 2014). Lone actors
are thought to have relatively limited opportunities and available resources needed to commit a
high-scale terrorist attack. In contrast, group actors typically have more combined resources and
opportunities to attack increasingly protected targets. The results did not support these
expectations, as group actors were actually less likely to select government targets than citizens
compared to lone actors.
While previous research has typically examined factors of target selection in isolation of
one another, it was predicted that these factors operate in particular sets or combinations to more
or less influence target selection. This study explored this question using conjunctive analysis of
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case configurations (CACC). The results of the CACC revealed that some configurations of
ideological and situational factors resulted in increased and decreased chances that terrorists
would select one type of target over another. In particular, incidents committed by lone acting
extreme far-right offenders who use moderately sophisticated weapons and travel greater than 31
miles to attack accessible and easily destroyed targets always result in the selection of citizenry
targets. Whereas incidents committed by Islamic extremist groups using highly sophisticated
weapons and travelling less than 30 miles to targets that are publicly inaccessible and difficult to
destroy always result in the selection of government targets. Comparing human and non-human
targets, the combination of extreme far-right lone actors with shorter plan cycle (0-90 days) who
use low sophisticated weapons to target publicly accessible locations always results in the
selection of non-human targets. In contrast, Islamic extremist groups relying on highly
sophisticated weapons and longer planning cycles who plan to attack publicly accessible
locations always results in the selection of human targets.
Finding that changes in one situational factor can significantly shape the relevance of other
factors for influencing target selection highlights their interrelatedness and what is missed by
focusing on the effects of single variables on outcomes of interest in isolation. It is true that some
factors, such as ideology or weapon type, might carry more weight in the decision-making
process; however how these factors ultimately shape target selection depends on the presence or
absence of other relevant situated opportunities. The number of people involved, the length
terrorists must travel to their selected targets, and how long terrorists plan and prepare for attacks
pose risks to the viability of terrorist plots. It is the culmination of these factors and their many
variations that ultimately shape terrorists’ selection of particular targets.
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Implications
A major goal of counterterrorism efforts at both the federal and state level is to be
proactive rather than reactive in responding to terrorism. This study adds to the growing body of
research on target selection, particularly within the context of terrorism. Being able to identify
the factors that are significant predictors of target selection can allow for law enforcement
agencies to be more proactive in identifying future terrorist plots and foiling them.
One of the significant factors presented in the study is the type of weapons being used to
select targets, particularly highly sophisticated weapons. Availability of highly sophisticated
weapons, including various forms of explosives, increases the opportunities of potential targets
to more secure facilities, such as government buildings and other large buildings to maximize
death and destruction. Following the techniques of situational crime prevention (Cornish and
Clarke, 2003), law enforcement should continue increased efforts to disrupt the access of these
weapons. Reducing availability and illicit access to highly sophisticated weapons could then in
turn reduce the number of opportunities for future terrorist attacks.
The results from the conjunctive analysis of case configurations (CACC) are also
important in helping law enforcement better identify combinations of factors linked to target
selection. Identifying patterns most likely to be associated to certain target types, highlights
targets that are most at risk of being attacked. For example, incidents committed by lone acting
extreme far-right offenders that use moderately sophisticated weapons are most likely to select
citizen targets in comparison to government targets. Being able to identify which targets are most
at risk can then allow law enforcement and other agencies to employ tactics, such as target
hardening to reduce the risk of being selected. As mentioned earlier, it is impossible to
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completely protect all potential targets. The findings from this study can help law enforcement
identify targets that remain at elevated levels of need for protection.
Limitations and Future Research
While this research adds to the growing body of literature on terrorism target selection, it
does not come without some limitations. One of the major limitations of the study is the
relatively small sample size. Terrorism itself is a rare event, so statistical analysis must take this
into account. Focusing only on far-right and Islamic extremists limits the sample size even
further. While these two major ideologies currently pose the largest threat within the United
States, we must be cautious applying the results from this study to all forms of terrorism. Future
research could also focus on far-left and environmental extremists to see if similar patterns exist.
Future research is also needed to further explore measures of target attractiveness and
vulnerability within the context of terrorism. The current study includes some target
attractiveness measures, however prior research provides little guidance in how to operationalize
these variables outside of major urban centers and for more common types of targets, including
businesses and private citizens. Expanding the scope of future research to include multiple
ideologies and target types will serve to refine the utility of situational crime prevention as a
framework for understanding terrorism through the eyes of terrorists, and will aid law
enforcement in increasing the costs and reducing the rewards for this serious type of crime.
Conclusion
This study adds to the growing body of literature examining target selection, specifically
as it relates to terrorism. Using data from the American Terrorism Study, the results indicate that
situational factors such as ideology and weapon sophistication are significant predictors of target
selection. The results also highlight how target selection is not dependent on any single factor,
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but rather the result of multiple factors structuring terrorists’ opportunities to plan, prepare, and
execute attacks. The findings from this study inform law enforcement and other stakeholders
about the factors shaping terrorists’ decisions to target one type of target over another. Guided by
situational crime prevention, anti-terrorism efforts should be target and ideology-specific, and
centered around reducing future risk of attacks, for instance, by reducing the rewards and
increasing the costs of using highly sophisticated weapons.

47

REFERENCES
Abrahms, M., & Potter, P. B. (2015). Explaining terrorism: Leadership deficits and militant
group tactics. International Organization, 69(2), 311-342.
Ahmed, R. (2018). Terrorist ideologies and target selection. Journal of applied security research,
13(3), 376-390.
Beccaria, Cesare (1983) [1764]. An essay on crimes and punishment. Brookline Village, MA:
Brandon Press.
Becker, M. (2014). Explaining lone wolf target selection in the United States. Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism, 37(11), 959-978.
Belli, R., & J. D. Freilich. (2009). Situational crime prevention and non-violent terrorism: A
“soft” approach against ideologically motivated tax refusal. Crime Prevention Studies,
25, 173-206.
Benson, Michael, Sams, Tara (2013). Emotions, choice and crime. The Oxford Handbook of
Criminological Theory, 494-510.
Boba, R. (2009). EVIL DONE. Crime Prevention Studies, 25, 71-91.
Borum, Randy. (2012). Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science
Theories. Journal of Strategic Security 4(4), 7-36.
Brantingham, P. J., & Brantingham, P. L. (1990). Environmental criminology (2nd ed.). Long
Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
Carmichael, Stephanie; Piquero, Alex (2004). Sanctions, perceived anger, and criminal
offending, Quantitative Criminology, 20, 371-393.
Clark, W. (2009). Bioterrorism: A situational crime prevention approach. Crime Prevention
Studies, 25, 93-110.
Clarke, R. V. G. (1980). Situational crime prevention: Theory and practice. British Journal of
Criminology, 20, 136-147.
Clarke, R. V. G. (Ed.). (1997). Situational crime prevention (pp. 225-256). Monsey, NY:
Criminal Justice Press.
Clarke, R. V. G., & Newman, G. R. (2006). Outsmarting the terrorists (p. 144). Westport, CT:
Praeger Security International.

48

Clarke, R.V., & Cornish, D.B. (1985). Modeling offenders' decisions: A framework for
research and policy. Crime and Justice, pp.147-185. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A Routine Activity
Approach. American Sociological Review, 44(4), 588-608.
Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (1987). Understanding crime displacement: An application of
rational choice theory. Criminology, 25(4), 933-948.
Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (Eds.). (2014). The reasoning criminal: Rational choice
perspectives on offending. Transaction Publishers.
Cullen, F. T., Agnew, R., & Wilcox, P. (2006). Criminological theory: Past to present: Essential
readings. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ebner, J. (2017). The rage: The vicious circle of Islamist and far-right extremism. Bloomsbury
Publishing.
Eck, J., & Weisburd, D. L. (2015). Crime places in crime theory. Crime and place: Crime
prevention studies, 4.
Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]. (2005). Terrorism: 2002-2005. United States Department
of Justice Report.
Felson, M., & Cohen, L. (1980). Human ecology and crime: A Routine Activity Approach.
Human Ecology, 8(4), 389-406.
Freilich, J. D., Chermak, S. M., Gruenewald, J., Parkin, W. S., & Klein, B. R. (2018). Patterns of
fatal extreme-right crime in the United States. Perspectives on Terrorism, 12(6), 38-51.
Ganor, B. (2002). Defining terrorism: Is one man's terrorist another man's freedom fighter?
Police Practice and Research, 3(4), 287-304.
Gruenewald, J., Allison-Gruenewald, K., & Klein, B. R. (2015). Assessing the attractiveness and
vulnerability of eco-terrorism targets: A situational crime prevention approach. Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 38(6), 433-455.
Gruenewald, J., Klein, B. R., Parkin, W. S., Freilich, J. D., & Chermak, S. (2018). A situated
comparison of suicide and non-suicide terrorist plots and homicides in the United States,
1990-2014. Crime & Delinquency, 65(9), 1187-1217.
Gruenewald, J., Drawve, G., & Smith, B. L. (2019). The situated contexts of American terrorism:
a conjunctive analysis of case configurations. Criminal Justice and ebhavior, 46(6), 884901.

49

Guerette, K. J., & Bowers, K. J. (2009). Assessing the extent of crime displacement and
diffusion of benefits: A review of situational crime prevention evaluations. Criminology,
47, 1331-1368.
Hoffman, B. (1998) Inside terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Jeffery, C. R. (1971). Crime prevention through environmental design (Vol. 91). Beverly Hills,
CA: Sage Publications.
Kundnani, A. (2012). Radicalization: The journey of a concept. Race and Class, 54(2), 3-25.
LaFree, G., Dugan, L., & Miller, E. (2014). Putting terrorism in context: Lessons from the
Global Terrorism Database. Routledge.
Lombroso, C. (2006) [1911]. Criminal man. Duke University Press.
Mandala, M., & Freilich, J. D. (2017). Preventing successful assassination attacks by terrorists:
An environmental criminology approach. Journal of Criminological Research, Policy and
Practice, 3, 173-191.
Merton, R. K. (1938). Social structure and anomie. American Sociological Review, 3(5), 672682.
Miethe, T. D., Hart, T. C., & Regoeczi, W. C. (2008). The conjunctive analysis of case
configurations: An exploratory method for discrete multivariate analyses of crime data.
Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 24, 227-241.
Parks, R., Burgess, E. W., & McKenzie, R. D. (1925). The city. Chicago, IL.
Sandler, T. (2014) The analytical study of terrorism: Taking stock. Journal of Peace
Research, 51, 257-271.
Santifort, C., Sandler, T., & Brandt, P. T. (2013). Terrorist attack and target diversity:
Changepoints and their drivers. Journal of Peace Research, 50(1), 75-90.
Sedgwick, M. (2010). The concept of radicalization as a source of confusion, Terrorism and
Political Violence, 22(4), 479-494.
Shaw, C.R., McKay, H. (1942). Juvenile delinquency and urban areas. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Sherman, L. W.; Gartin, P. R.; Buerger, M. E. (1989). Hot spots of predatory crime: Routine
activities and the criminology of place. Criminology, 27(1), 27-56.
Smith, B. L., Cothren, J., Roberts, P., & Damphousse, K. R. (2008). Geospatial analysis of
terrorist activities: The identification of spatial and temporal patterns of preparatory

50

behavior of international and environmental terrorists. Final Report to the National
Institute of Justice. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.
Smith, B. L., Gruenewald, J., Damphousse, K. R., Roberts, P., Ratcliff, K., Klein, B. R., &
Brecht, I. (2016). Sequencing Terrorists' Precursor Behaviors: A Crime Specific
Analysis. Final Report to the National Institute of Justice. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Justice.
Asal, V.H., Rethemeyer, R.K., Anderson, I., Stein, A., Rizzo, J., & Rozea, M. (2009) The softest
of targets: A study on terrorist target selection. Journal of Applied Security Research,
4(3), 258-278.
Weisburd, D., Wycoff, L. A., Ready, J., Eck, J. E., & Hinkle, J. C. (2006). Does crime just move
around the corner? A controlled study of spatial displacement and diffusion of crime
control benefits. Criminology, 44, 549-592.
Weisburd, D., & Green, L. (1995). Policing drug hot spots: The Jersey City drug market analysis
experiment. Justice Quarterly, 12(4), 711-736.
Wortley, R. (2002). Situational prison control: Crime prevention in correctional institutions.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Yun, M. (2009). Application of situational crime prevention to terrorist hostage taking and
kidnapping: A case study of 23 Korean hostages in Afghanistan. Crime Prevention
Studies, 25, 111-139.

51

